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We often hear the basic question: “Why 
some countries are rich and others are poor”. 
This has been one of the major questions of 
political economy (and even long before) its 
more formal or scientific formulation in the 
late 18th century.  Most prominently and es-
pecially England, at a time when Western Eu-
rope, was experiencing an economic upheav-
al, disruptions that would totally transform 
the lives of its inhabitants. Over the last two 
hundred years, economic development has 
been rather uneven1. Some countries have wit-
nessed steady growth, year after year, while 
others stagnated. Some have become rich and 
then declined. After WWII, the world became 
divided into three areas: Western countries, 
the Eastern block, and the South. The first 
two fought a battle of ideas over a most fun-
damental question — that of the nature of hu-
man societies and the role of freedom. They 
also fought to impose their respective model 
over the South — the developing world — and 
to control its natural resources. After more 
than half a century of a destructive approach 
to development, things are now changing and 
we may have reasons to be optimistic for the 
next twenty years.
1 In modern economics, the notion of economic 
development generally encompasses the emer-
gence of norms, rules, and institutions that enable 
economic growth to occur. In other words, growth 
takes place within a given framework, while devel-
opment is also about changes and improvements 
in the framework itself. Note that nowhere in the 
works of 19th century classical economists is “eco-
nomic development” separated from the general 
understanding of wealth creation within the mar-
ketplace. Economic development was simply the 
process of trade and capital accumulation at works 
in markets.
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In the last quarter of the 19th century, Eu-
ropeans and Americans were five times more 
productive than somebody living in Asia or 
Africa. This gap didn’t worry Economists who 
thought poor countries would eventually catch 
up with rich ones. But the great convergence 
didn’t materialize. Hundred years later, at the 
end of the 20th century, the income disparity 
between the richest countries and the poor-
est ones had risen to 19 times. Over the past 
four decades, poverty as a percentage of total 
population of the poorest area of the world — 
i.e. sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) — has remained 
high; roughly 70 percent of its population lived 
on US$2 a day adjusted for purchasing power 
parity. Over the same period, GDP per capita 
for the region has also been flat between $500 
and $600 per annum in 2000 US dollars.
In the 1950s most economists in the West 
believed in the virtues of government-led de-
velopment planning. The idea was that the 
poorest countries were stuck in a Poverty Trap 
from which they could not emerge without an 
aid-financed Big Push. Peter Bauer ominously 
criticized the idea at the time, but to no avail. 
Recent studies have, however, confirmed his 
views [W. Easterly 2002]. Poverty can persist 
in some cases for some period of time, but 
the stagnation of the poorest countries in the 
world, especially in SSA, has a lot to do with 
bad government rather than fate. In other 
words, there is strong evidence that differenc-
es in levels of poverty around  the world and 
their variations have to do with differences in 
the quality of institutions [W. Easterly 2006].
A similar conclusion was reached in the 
study of the impact of development aid. Aid 
has played the role of a Big Push in many 
cases, and while it accelerated, growth in SSA 
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declined — from around 2 percent per annum 
until the early 1970s down to zero after that. 
Whether aid caused the fall in growth or low 
growth prompted aid has been, and still is, a 
hotly debated subject. Unfortunately for those 
who see aid as a cornerstone of development, 
there are only a few cases of countries that 
received aid and subsequently experienced a 
take off, while many other countries received 
aid and did not take off. It is difficult to estab-
lish theoretically and empirically a positive ef-
fect of aid on development and growth. As yet, 
the Big Push (i.e. aid) has not had the effects 
that many expected.
Accordingly, the last ten years have wit-
nessed more and more skepticism among 
economists and others regarding the effects of 
development aid. Until the 1990s the appeal 
of development plans was very strong2. Even 
the use of the term “aid,” as Bauer brilliantly 
noted, benefited those who supported it, as it 
promoted an unquestioning attitude3. Yet, af-
ter decades of aid, it has become more accept-
ed that aid has not created sustained develop-
ment because the process of development is 
a complex one and artificially engineering it 
has remained beyond the pale of policymak-
ers. While economists may know the “what” of 
development, they don’t know the “how.” Bau-
er’s view — that development cannot be engi-
neered — has now gained greater acceptance. 
Economists understand better the real process 
of aid itself, and by contrast, the nature of eco-
nomic development.
Aid is rarely delivered according to plan and 
the aid process is fraught with difficulties of all 
kinds. It is better to think of it as a bargain-
ing game played by numerous players who all 
have different intentions. Because it reduces 
the cost of public spending (in terms of taxa-
2 A contemporary defender of the development 
plan view is Jeffrey Sachs (2005).
3 As Peter Bauer (1993, page 2) explained, the term 
aid “disarms criticism, obscures realities, and pre-
judges results. Who could be against aid to the less 
fortunate? The term has enabled aid supporters to 
claim a monopoly of compassion and to dismiss 
critics as lacking in understanding and sympathy.”
tion to be levied), aid transfers have enabled 
rulers to pursue policies favoring themselves 
and their supporters, thereby providing re-
sources to those who are well organized and 
leaving the others in a situation of growing 
dependency. Those who benefit from the sta-
tus quo have no interest in changing the situ-
ation. Not only aid cannot generate growth, it 
actually participates in the deterioration of the 
institutions the recipient countries may have 
[S. Djankow et al. 2008]. The deterioration 
of institutions weakens the long- term growth 
prospects of recipient countries. As institu-
tions become weaker, the rule of law disap-
pears, corruption increases, and rent seek-
ing becomes widespread. Because aid can be 
seen as a windfall, it has a similar effect on 
beneficiaries as natural resources can have — 
it creates an “aid curse.” Until the 1990s, aid 
was the mantra of the economics of develop-
ment. While Peter Bauer saw no reason why 
the fundamental concepts of economic theory 
— incentives, supply and demand, and entre-
preneurship — should not apply to develop-
ing countries, the profession instead placed 
the emphasis on structural economic condi-
tions. The causality was wrong; policy makers 
sought macroeconomics outcomes rather than 
establishing the institutional underpinnings 
of individual choice and trade.
Somewhere along the way in the 20th cen-
tury, economics lost all reference to the frame-
work in which human action takes place, 
and which gives action its social dimension. 
Where Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations 
had emphasized the role of the basic institu-
tions of the English Common Law — the laws 
of property, contract, and tort —, economists 
of the modern sort abandoned the idea of the 
primacy of institutions and focused on solving 
problems of constrained maximization. The 
classical emphasis on institutions stemmed 
from the Smithian view of the human propen-
sity to truck, barter, and exchange, and the 
institutional arrangements that promote this 
propensity. Some 20th century economists, 
such as Peter Bauer, James Buchanan, Fried-
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rich Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises remained 
focused on the importance of institutions in 
the understanding of economic phenomena. 
For Mises, individual property rights and their 
transfer enable social cooperation under the 
division of labor. Because individual owners 
are residual claimants, they allocate resources 
to their highest value and, doing so, they pro-
mote the interest of others.
The other key mechanism that disappeared 
in 20th century economics was the entrepre-
neurial function. With a few exceptions such as 
Joseph Schumpeter, most authors, “whether 
explicitly or simply by virtue of omission, con-
sider entrepreneurial supply to have played a 
passive part in the drama whose major themes 
were invention, changing factor prices, and 
new market opportunities” [P. Kilby 1971, p. 
3]. Gains in productivity are necessary for per 
capita income growth to occur, and these gains 
are only possible if shifts from less produc-
tive to more productive techniques take place 
through the creation of new commodities, new 
material, new organizational forms, and new 
knowledge. The entrepreneur is the discoverer 
of hitherto unknown gains from trade. He is 
the driving force behind productivity gains 
that are crucial to the processes of economic 
development and growth [I. Kirzner, F. Sautet 
2006].  These processes do not simply consist 
of physical and human capital accumulation. 
If this were the case, they would simply be 
the result of greater savings. More than just 
physical and human capital accumulation is 
required to obtain development and growth; 
the introduction of sheer (socially useful) nov-
elty is also necessary (i.e. innovation). In this 
sense, the entrepreneur, as the agent of cre-
ation, is the source of actual change.
As William Baumol pointed out, the social 
effect of entrepreneurial activity is determined 
by the quality of the formal and informal in-
stitutional make up of a society [W. Baumol 
1990]. This is where the role of institutions 
intersects with that of the entrepreneurial 
function. Entrepreneurs may discover socially 
productive or unproductive activities depend-
ing on the relative payoffs society offers. When 
property rights are well defined and enforced, 
entrepreneurial activity is socially productive. 
But when individuals know that they can lob-
by governments for their own benefit, entre-
preneurs will divert their gaze towards socially 
unproductive activities. Institutions form the 
basis of the economic capital of society, which, 
depending on its nature, may empower indi-
viduals to become creative — i.e. to be entre-
preneurs.
Many rules in society evolve without cen-
tralization. This is because entrepreneurs not 
only discover gains from trade in the econo-
my; they also discover ways of improving the 
framework within which they operate. This can 
be at the public level with institutional entre-
preneurs who change laws and legislation, but 
also at the private level where entrepreneurs 
devise new contracting technologies.  In devel-
oping countries entrepreneurs are behind the 
development of methods used to create and 
enforce property rights and the emergence of 
private market governance [Boettke and Lee-
son 2009]. They create the institutional frame-
work in which trade takes place; a framework 
that government and reformers often ignore at 
their peril. Because of its effects on the evolu-
tion of rules and norms, entrepreneurship is 
not only the engine of economic growth; it is 
also the driving force of development.
Today, institutions have taken a more im-
portant place in theory and in policy [D. Ac-
emoglu et al. 2005]. Even if pundits such as 
Joseph Stiglitz have criticized it, what be-
came known as the “Washington Consensus” 
(which emphasizes sound microeconomic 
policy, macroeconomic stability, and robust 
institutions), has had a profound impact on 
policymakers. The tales of the two Germanys 
and the two Koreas show how dramatic the 
role of institutions can be in economic per-
formance [M. Olson 1996]. But policy choices 
(in terms of fiscal, monetary, and exchange 
rate for instance), when they deeply affect the 
decisions entrepreneurs can make, can also 
influence long-term growth [P.B. Henry, C. 
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Miller 2009]. It is now well recognized that (a) 
well- defined, enforced, divisible, and transfer-
able property rights (available to a very broad 
cross- section of society), (b) low taxation, and 
(c) open trade, constitute the core of a good in-
stitutional and policy framework. To this core, 
one can add the notion of rule of law, limited 
public spending, a light- handed regulatory 
framework (including the ease of doing busi-
ness), and transparent and responsible pub-
lic governance4. These institutions and policy 
form the basic economic capital that can pro-
mote a creative and prosperous society.
These items can be considered as causal 
factors in the process of development, but they 
often emerge in the process itself. The problem 
is that though institutions are crucial to entre-
preneurship and development, building them 
is a very difficult issue. The experience with the 
transposition of Western institutions in devel-
oping economies has been poor. Transferred 
institutions are not often well adopted, which 
shows how endogenous the development of 
institutions can be. It is difficult for outsid-
ers to understand why particular institutional 
arrangements work in certain circumstances 
and not in others. Local knowledge is crucial 
to policymaking, but is often hard to obtain. 
Moreover, the issue is not only which institu-
tional difference may explain why some coun-
tries are rich and others are  poor (although 
this is important), it is also understanding why 
each country follows a specific path of insti-
tutional development. Some see institutional 
paths as the results of pure luck; for instance 
the luck of an elite group of country blessed by 
4 Other issues such as a good physical infrastruc-
ture should be considered as consequences rather 
than preconditions of development. Clearly better 
roads and cell phones are creating virtuous cycles 
of growth in many African countries such as Ke-
nya. But these are the results, not the cause, of 
development. Also, access to capital and equality 
of opportunity should not be considered as part of 
the institutional framework favorable to growth, 
as they can promote policies that generate socially 
unproductive entrepreneurship.
culture and history — the “happy chance” of 
Western Europe.
The world is perhaps at the dawn of the new 
era, as the long expected convergence may be 
around the corner. Today there are more and 
more people living in countries with growth 
rates higher than that of the G7 average. If 
this trend continues, global growth in the next 
twenty years could be the highest recorded in 
human history. Until recently, the only miss-
ing element was SSA, which had experienced 
no growth between 1970 and the 2000s. This 
is changing, however, with a greater aware-
ness of the importance of local solutions to 
institutional deficiencies (thanks to social 
entrepreneurship) and a better appreciation 
of aid’s lethal effects. “Trade rather than aid” 
has become a new mantra. Hence, this new 
century is witnessing a dramatic turnaround 
in Africa’s fortunes, with six of the world’s 
ten fastest-growing economies today in SSA, 
which is experiencing a surge  in foreign direct 
investment [E. Miguel 2009]. This evolution 
is one of the most unexpected developments 
in the last decade; a major “discontinuity” that 
policymakers had not seen coming.
Success in development is a reflection of 
the fact that more and more resources are dis-
covered and allocated through market mecha-
nisms. In spite of what its critics say, global-
ization pushes countries in a cycle of virtuous 
change. Witness the success on the Doing 
Business index of countries such as Georgia, 
Thailand, Mauritius, and Malaysia, which rank 
above many E.U. countries. And as far as SSA 
is concerned, Rwanda and Zambia have dra-
matically progressed in recent times5. Clearly, 
the Doing Business index only measures a 
small aspect of what makes a good framework 
for growth and development; but it is an im-
portant one nonetheless.
The current evolution is often local — such 
as the implementation of community- based 
natural resource management in Namibia — 
and for that reason more sustainable. It even-
5 Rwanda is ranked 58 in 2011, up from 70 in 
2010. Zambia is 76, up from 84.
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tually translates into better governance of lo-
cal firms and public organizations. The world 
is becoming more global and yet more local. 
The Apple iPod is designed in the US and built 
in China with components coming from Japan 
and other Asian economies. But if the impor-
tance of local knowledge continues to grow, 
especially in emerging markets, multination-
als may be limited in their growth. Wal- Mart 
is a big US company and yet it cannot pene-
trate certain markets.
Under current trends, the Hopeless Conti-
nent (as Africa was called not long ago) may 
show, one more time, that development can 
occur anywhere. The G7 economies will ac-
count for a constantly diminishing share of the 
world GDP as the Asian, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China), and some African econo-
mies continue to develop. Four major down-
side risks should be accounted for, however.
First, the geopolitics of aid is likely to con-
tinue in the years to come and this may damp-
en the dynamism of economies that could 
otherwise move up faster. Policy experts and 
other organized groups should continue to fa-
vor trade, not aid. Yet, aid could also subside 
in the next twenty years if the fiscal situation 
of Western countries were to worsen. Such a 
situation would be another “discontinuity;” an 
unexpected, but clearly possible, event. In oth-
er words, there could be a silver lining to a di-
sastrous situation: the developing world could 
benefit from the West’s fiscal chaos. Even if de-
velopment aid only represents a small portion 
of OECD countries’ budgets, when urgency re-
quires cutting spending, aid could be amongst 
the first items to be sacrificed.
Second, Western countries may continue 
to engage in protectionism and subsidies, and 
increase their reluctance to trade with their 
poorer neighbors, as western populations fear 
competition from low- income economies. 
For instance, the US government subsidizes 
cotton, which has depreciated world prices 
for many years and has had lethal effects on 
developing economies. The developed world 
may also impose its own standards on its poor 
counterpart (especially in terms of environ-
mental policy) as a precondition to trade. Pro-
tectionism is a serious risk for the developing 
world. More policies, such as the 2000 African 
Growth and Opportunity Act in the US (which 
reduced tariff rates on African textiles) should 
be enacted in Western countries.
Third, part of the growth in African coun-
tries in the last decade has been fuelled by high 
prices in mineral and oil resources. Another 
part has been heavy foreign investments, es-
pecially from China. Armed conflicts may still 
represent a danger if resource prices were to 
fall. These conflicts have been widespread in 
African countries in the last three decades, 
as 70 percent of them have been at war for at 
least one year.
Finally, as poor economies create more and 
more wealth, the demand for more democratic 
institutions may rise. But with more democ-
racy may also come the risks associated with 
politics and the dynamic of special interests. 
This could squander the newly created wealth 
before it generates a real takeoff [F. Zakaria 
2007]. Various election crises in the last de-
cade (such as in Kenya or in the Ivory Coast) 
have shown the limits of democratic reforms 
and the latent social divisions that still exist 
in  many countries. In their transition towards 
democracy, developing countries should con-
tinue to pay attention to political competition 
and constitutional constraints, and their role 
in limiting socially unproductive entrepre-
neurship.
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